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WORKING PAPER

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NEAR EAST/AFRICA DIVISION

INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

Vol. V No.3

For Week Ending  
25 January 1950

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## NEAR EAST/AFRICA INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

## GREECE

Election preliminaries: Preparations for the Greek national elections appear to be taking a normal course under the administration of the new Theotokis "service" government. Despite initial fear that the interim regime might prove a vehicle for palace intervention in politics, Theotokis is apparently carrying out his pledge of a free electoral atmosphere: restrictions on civil liberties imposed during the guerrilla campaign have been relaxed; the armed forces, police, and gendarmerie have been given firm orders against interference with the campaigning; and efforts are being made to forestall disruptive incidents by Communist guerrillas or armed rightists. Theotokis has deferred to the wishes of the party leaders in his decision to keep the proportional representation system. Meanwhile, his postponement of the elections from 19 February until 5 March, so as to permit more complete revision of electoral lists and more extended party campaigning, is generally popular even though the two major parties, the rightist Populists and the centrist Liberals, apparently feel that the postponement favors their less well-organized rivals.

Although the threat of the palace-sponsored entry of Marshal Papagos into politics has subsided for the time being, leaders of the two major parties may well worry about the future. In the recent maneuverings of the 80-odd Greek political parties, a rightist bloc has emerged to attract extremist followers away from the plurality Populists, whose chances of winning new support from splinter groups grow daily slimmer and whose internal structure shows increasing signs of disintegration. Meanwhile, leftist elements of the Liberal Party following may be lured away by the new left-of-center group under General Plastiras, even though the Liberals have shown an ability to win new backing and may possibly supplant the Populists as the largest single party. Present trends indicate that the post-election Parliament will be characterized by numerous small combinations that will wield important balance-of-power influence and that may be in a position to hamstring effective parliamentary government.

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## TURKEY

Cyprus and the Turks: Results of the unofficial "plebiscite" in Cyprus, which will undoubtedly indicate that a large majority of the population favor enosis (union with Greece), will arouse strongly unfavorable reactions in Turkey. Because of the key position Cyprus occupies off Turkey's southern coast, the Turks believe that sovereignty over the island should remain with the British rather than be transferred to a country like Greece, which could easily be overrun by the Soviets. According to a constantly repeated, but not necessarily official, Turkish view, Cyprus should be returned to Turkey if any change in its status must be made. The Turks accordingly tend to attribute enosis agitation principally to a diabolical Communist scheme to involve Greece in dissension, not only with the UK, but also with Turkey. In their eyes, political concessions to the island's Greek-speaking majority would be one thing. A change in sovereignty, however, would be quite another-- and if the enosis question becomes more acute the Turks may feel compelled to take a firm official stand on the matter.

## IRAN

Razmara boom checked: Recent efforts to promote the candidacy of Chief of Staff Razmara for the premiership have now been sharply checked. Rumors that Razmara might be given the post not only have been dismissed by Prime Minister Saed on the ground that Razmara lacks political stature for the job, but also have produced disclaimers from the Shah himself. The latter has reportedly asserted that: (1) he would never consent to Razmara's forming a government; and (2) Razmara was a military man who would be expected to confine himself to military matters.

The sudden deflation of the Razmara boom leaves in doubt the question of how it ever was allowed to develop in the first place. Although Razmara never went so far as to announce his candidacy openly, he did make clear in private not only that he would accept the post if offered him but that he felt particularly competent to clear up Iran's current problems; and whether he would have made such a move without prior consultation with the Shah is questionable. While Razmara may in fact have acted independently, it is possible that the Shah authorized some feelers on the subject to get an idea of what the reaction would be if he were to call Razmara to the premiership in the event of a real crisis.

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## INDIA-PAKISTAN

Tension unabated: Continuing animosity between India and Pakistan and the possibility that it may lead to war will overshadow the proclaiming of the Indian Republic on 26 January. The trade war between the two states has not abated. The Kashmir question is no closer to solution (particularly with the Security Council side-tracked on the issue of China's representation on the Council). Neither country desires war, and India, which opposes an early plebiscite in Kashmir and therefore favors continuation of the status quo, certainly will not initiate hostilities. There are indications, however, that the Government of Pakistan is reaching the limit of its patience. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan recently declared in the Constituent Assembly that, no matter what the consequences, Pakistan would not forsake the millions of Kashmiri Moslems or allow India to dominate Kashmir by force. The possibility thus exists that India's uncompromising attitude toward Kashmir, together with other matters of dispute between the countries, may cause the Pakistanis to choose war in preference to the conditions which they believe Indian policy is forcing upon them.

## NOTED IN BRIEF

The astute leaders of Turkey's opposition Democratic Party, having maneuvered the government into what many workers might well consider an anti-labor position, are persuasively publicizing themselves as the real champions of the labor cause. The Democrats have vigorously advocated the right to strike (which Turkish workers do not possess), and--despite the government's preparation of bills designed to improve the workers' lot--government spokesmen have been kept busy justifying the official position that strikes are outmoded and apt to lead to dangerous national dissension.

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Should the US decide to recall its diplomatic mission in Bulgaria, the Turks may well decide to take similar action, thus beginning what might conceivably develop into a widespread diplomatic boycott of at least one Soviet-satellite state.

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An Iranian military court, in a move regarded in Tehran as a political reprisal, has sentenced Dr. Baghai, a leading opposition deputy in the last Majlis, to one year imprisonment for "insulting the army." Although the specific charge is not known, Baghai probably incurred army wrath last spring when he bitterly attacked Chief of Staff Razmara during a twelve-day filibuster in the Majlis. Apparently spurred by this allegedly retaliatory act and also in preparation for the coming Tehran Majlis elections, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq, the head of the oppositionist party, has announced he will return from self-imposed exile outside Tehran to carry on Baghai's self-styled "fight against the ruling class." Mossadeq's party obtained a heavy vote in the recently annulled Majlis elections.

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